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ABSTRACT
Incentives play a pivotal role in stimulating user-generated
content (UGC), which is critical to the viability and success
of today’s social computing services. Non-financial social in-
centives are generally effective in boosting the quantity, but
have limited effect on the quality. Conversely, financial in-
centives generally motivate better quality, but often compli-
cate the efforts to attract quantity. In this paper, we propose
knowledge barter-auctioning, a non-financial remunerative
mechanism that is particularly effective in stimulating the
quality of UGC yet without detriment to its quantity. This
mechanism provides an optimal way for the knowledge ven-
dor to choose the best barter partner in order to maximise
their expected revenue, which is an extrinsic motivation for
the triumph of quality as UGC of higher quality will en-
able the vendor to attract more bidders and consequently
make a higher revenue through the barter auction. We have
conducted a series of experiments using a real-world dataset
to analyse the ramifications of UGC quality in knowledge
bartering processes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
User-generated content (UGC) is the foundation of so-
cial computing services like social media, social networking,
and question-answering (Q&A). Sustained participation and
UGC contributions from users are critical to the viability
and success of an online social community [18]. If everyone
chose to free-ride on the efforts of others, the community
would eventually collapse and the social computing service
would cease to exist naturally [24]. Therefore, a healthy
online social ecosystem requires an effective incentive mech-
anism, which needs to consider both intrinsic or extrinsic
motivational factors. Intrinsic motivations reflect sponta-
neous self-satisfaction from one’s participation itself rather
than its payoff, including enjoyment of altruism [17], recipro-
cation [1], or obligation to contribute [24]. Extrinsic motiva-
tions revolve around the payoff for one’s participation rather
than the participation per se, that is, the expected benefits
of contributing are perceived to exceed the cost of making
the contribution, including improvement of skills through
receiving feedback from others [13], building up professional
reputation within the community [24], or receiving rewards,
which can be either financial [20] or non-financial [9].
A representative non-financial remunerative mechanism is
virtual currency, which has been widely adopted in social me-
dia and online social communities for users to purchase vir-
tual goods, virtual friends, or simply information. For exam-
ple, in Yahoo!Answers, one is rewarded points for their an-
swer acknowledged by the asker, which can be accumulated
and redeemed to post their own questions. Virtual currency
may have partially tackled the quantity issue by stimulating
participants to earn more “virtual money” through making
more UGC contributions, but its impact on the quality is
questionable because participants can easily accumulate vir-
tual wealth by exploiting the system rather than through the
hard work of improving the quality of their contributions.
An example of non-financial remunerative mechanisms ad-
dressing the quality issue is social attention stemmed from
the theory of social psychology, where a UGC contribution
of higher quality is rewarded more exposure or viewer atten-
tion. Work has been done to study reasonable allocation of
exposure opportunities among users based on their contribu-
tions using game-theoretic models [5, 6]. Studies [20] have
further shown that social incentives (based on intrinsic and
non-financial extrinsic motivational factors) are more effec-
tive in boosting the quantity than financial incentives, but
the latter exert more positive influences on the quality.
In this paper, we propose knowledge barter-auctioning, a
non-financial remunerative incentive mechanism that is par-
ticularly effective in stimulating the quality of UGC yet with-
out detriment to its quantity. This mechanism provides an
optimal way for the knowledge vendor to choose the best
barter partner in order to maximise their expected revenue,
an extrinsic motivation for the triumph of quality as UGC of
higher quality will enable the vendor to attract more com-
petitors and consequently make a higher revenue through the
barter auction. We have conducted a series of experiments
using a real-world dataset to analyse the ramifications of
UGC quality in knowledge bartering processes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first
introduce related work in the next section. We then describe
the conceptual model followed by the working mechanism
of knowledge barter-auctioning. After that, we present a
series of experiments and discuss the experimental results.
Finally, we conclude the paper with a summary of major
contributions and future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
From the economical point of view, knowledge has value
and an online social community should be not only a plat-
form for users to create and consume knowledge but also a
market for users to trade their knowledge. Knowledge buy-
ers are individuals who try to solve a complex issue that
precludes an easy answer and knowledge sellers are those
who have a reputation for their substantial knowledge about
a subject or process. Knowledge trading in knowledge mar-
kets is established on the belief that both buyers and sellers
can benefit from exchanging their intellectual properties [15].
As a representative example of online knowledge mar-
kets, online question-answering systems can be categorised
into community question-answering services (CQA) and fee-
based question-answering services. Because knowledge shar-
ing by answering questions is not subsidised in CQA, an
incentive mechanism is required to encourage participants
to dedicate their efforts to knowledge sharing. Altruism ex-
ists to some extent, but it is not always good enough to
motivate participants to devote themselves to difficult tasks.
Virtual currency is more widely adopted as a non-financial
trading model for online knowledge markets, However, as it
is a metaphor of real currency, it inevitably inherits most of
economic problems such as inflation and deflation [8] as par-
ticipants can easily accumulate virtual wealth through acts
like collusions or sockpuppets.
In recent years, some research has been done to explore
motivational factors from social psychology perspectives. High
interaction and rating in an online social community gener-
ally make participants feel satisfied, thus encouraging them
to contribute more and better. Dearman and Truong found
that in CQA systems, the most significant reason for a user
(not) to answer a question is not the question itself, but the
perceived importance of their answer by the asker and the
perceived ranking of the answer by all answerers [3]. So-
cial psychological rewards, such as social attention, are not
unlimited resources and therefore should be distributed ap-
propriately amongst participants to incentivise desirable be-
haviours. Game-theoretical approach is considered a good
choice for analysing the design of such allocation mecha-
nism [22]. For example, Jain et al. proposed a game-theoretic
model of sequential information aggregation motivated by
online question-answering forums and investigated the effect
of different rules for allocating points on the equilibrium be-
haviour [9]. A game-theoretical model was also used to anal-
yse the impact of exposing mechanisms like elimination and
ranking on the elicitation of high quality contributions as
the participation or attention diverged [4].
As a pioneer of fee-based question-answering services, Google
Answers adopted a financial trading model allowing askers
to offer bounties to the experts who have provided good an-
swers to their questions. However, financial incentives do
not lead to more and sustained user participation. Shah et
al. reported that Google Answers did not gain more popu-
larity than its CQA counterpart Yahoo! Answer [21]. Ra-
ban analysed two expert subgroups in an online information
market and showed that a pure financial incentive serves as
enticement, however, social incentives induce persistent par-
ticipation by experts and eventually lead to higher average
economic gains [19]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
questions of higher prices would necessarily receive better
answers. Chen et al. observed that offering a higher re-
ward for a question often leads to a significantly longer, but
unnecessarily better, answer, while answerers with a higher
reputation usually provide significantly better answers [2].
Jeon et al. again concluded that price is a factor in deter-
mining whether a question could receive answers, however it
does not have a direct effect on the quality of answers [10].
We want to investigate the quality issue from a differ-
ent perspective. Increasing the price of a question may not
necessarily get a better answer, but a UGC contribution of
higher quality should sell for a better price through auction-
ing, a widely used game-theoretic model. Furthermore, to
avoid the ramifications of a financial system, a non-financial
payment solution based on knowledge bartering [14] is inte-
grated into the auctioning mechanism, leading to a unique
solution referred to as barter-auctioning. The auction theory
has been used in many applications such as advertisement
positions in web pages [23]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that combines the auction theory with
the bartering economic model to design an incentive mech-
anism for online knowledge markets.
3. ACONCEPTUALMODELFORKNOWL-
EDGE BARTER-AUCTIONING
We proposed knowledge bartering [14] as an alternative
non-financial remunerative mechanism for online social com-
munities, which allows one to barter a knowledge item they
have as an exchange for another item they wish to have. It
primarily stimulates the quantity of UGC contributions be-
cause the more one can offer to others, the more one can get
from others. It does have implications on the quality to some
extent because the higher quality a UGC contribution has,
the more likely it is accepted as barter, however it has no
guarantee that a low quality UGC contribution would never
be part of a successful barter transaction and consequently
is unable to prevent self-interested users from exploiting the
system by bartering their low quality UGC.
The online silk road solution was further proposed to au-
tomate knowledge bartering processes in order to maximise
the social welfare within an online social community. It
adopted a centralised strategy: first generating a complete
directed graph representing participants and their supply-
demand relationships, then finding potential barter transac-
tions by discovering cycles in the graph, and finally produc-
ing all knowledge bartering online silk roads, each consisting
of cycles with the maximum cardinality. The ultimate goal
was to single out the maximum-weight online silk road con-
sisting of cycles whose length is under a constraint in order to
achieve social welfare maximisation, that is, the community
as a whole can gain the maximum benefit.
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Figure 1: Supply-demand relationships
Each participant must clearly describe their supply and
demand in order to establish supply-demand relationships
and derive the quality of supply in relation to the demand
(denoted by the weight of each edge in the graph). Fig-
ure 1 shows an example of knowledge bartering consisting
of 4 participants and 8 supply-demand relationships, where
the maximum-weight online silk road consists of two cycles:
{P1, P2, P3} and {P1, P3, P4}. A participant is allowed to
barter the same UGC with multiple parties, for example,
P1 passes on her/his barter B
k
1 to both P2 and P3 and re-
ceives Bm3 and B
n
4 from P3 and P4 respectively as a return in
the two cycles. Knowledge quality is only used in determin-
ing the maximum-weight online silk road but not directly
involved in choosing the barter partners, for example, two
low quality supplies (P1 → P2) and (P3 → P1) have to be
included in the barter transactions.
Built upon the foundation of knowledge bartering for boost-
ing the quantity of UGC contributions and auction as a pro-
found theory in applied economics for selling goods to poten-
tial buyers with unknown values [11], we propose knowledge
barter-auctioning to further stimulate the quality of UGC
contributions through the following measures.
• It adopts a distributed strategy: no graph needs to be
generated, no cycle needs to be discovered, and each
barter transaction only involves two parties. The 2-
party bartering solution is more efficient and robust
than the multi-party one and not susceptible to a single
point of failure.
• It does not ask participants to describe their demand
requirements; instead each participant only needs to
profile their set of interests (SOI) and label each of their
UGC contributions with an appropriate SOI. In Fig-
ure 1, edges (P1 → P2), (P1 → P3), and (P1 → P4) in-
dicate that P1’s B
k
1 is within P2’s, P3’s, and P4’s SOIs,
that is, SOI(Bk1 ) ∩ SOI(Pi) 6= ∅, where 1 < i ≤ 4.
A SOI has a broader coverage than a specific demand,
making it possible for more barter opportunities.
• It is based on the assumption that participants are self-
interested. Therefore its primary objective is to max-
imise individuals’ benefits through an optimal auction-
ing mechanism rather than the social welfare through
discovering online silk roads.
For the example in Figure 1, for P1 to maximise her/his
benefit from bartering Bk1 , she/he would need to ensure its
quality as a high-quality UGC contribution is likely to at-
tract high-quality bids from the potential competitors P2,
P3, and P4 through an auctioning process. If the auction is
successful, one of the competitors, for example, P4, will win
the barter and consequently P1 will transfer her/his barter-
ing right of Bk1 to P4. For the same token, competitors are
also motivated to ensure the quality of their UGC contribu-
tions in order to win the bid.
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Figure 2: Knowledge barter-auctioning
Figure 2 depicts the knowledge barter-auctioning process
for P1 to auction B
k
1 to the competitors P2, P3, and P4
through a trading centre.
1. Vendor P1 dispatches barter item B
k
1 and SOI(P1) to
the trading centre.
2. The trading centre first generates a summary of Bk1
using an extractive summarisation technique [7] and
then displays the summary of Bk1 and SOI(P1) in the
market. The summary serves the purpose of attracting
potential buyers without revealing the full content in
order to protect the vendor’s intellectual property .
3. Qualified bidders {Pi | 1 < i ≤ 4∧SOI(Bk1 )∩SOI(Pi) 6=
∅ ∧ ∀i,∃j:SOI(Bji ) ∩ SOI(P1) 6= ∅} each privately
evaluate the quality of the published summary of Bk1
based on which they send a barter item of their own as
a bid to the trading centre. In this example, the qual-
ified bidders are P2, P3, and P4 whose bids are B
l
2,
Bm3 , and B
n
4 respectively. Private quality evaluation
may consider factors such as relevance, vendor’s trust-
worthiness, and bidder’s personal preferences, but it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
4. The trading centre verifies the SOI and quality of each
bid, determines the winner of this auction, and com-
pletes the barter-auctioning process by delivering the
auctioned barter item to the winner and the winning
bid to the vendor. In this example, P1’s B
k
1 is success-
fully bartered with P4’s B
n
4 .
4. AN OPTIMAL AUCTION MECHANISM
FOR KNOWLEDGE BARTERING
In an open knowledge market, it is reasonable to assume
all knowledge owners (vendors or buyers) are selfish, ratio-
nal, and autonomous, each seeking to maximise their own
expected revenue through bartering their knowledge goods.
Considering each UGC contribution to be a single indivisi-
ble item, a pivotal issue is for the vendor to choose a barter
partner from more than one competitor in order to max-
imise their expected revenue through an auction where the
vendor’s revenue is determined by competition among the
bidders according to the rules set out by the vendor.
4.1 Auction Theory
In mechanism deign theory, an auction mechanism has
three key elements: a set of bids, an allocation rule, and a
payment rule. The allocation and payment rules are both
functions of the bids, where the former determines the prob-
ability in which each bidder will win the competition, while
the latter determines the payment the winner must make.
According to the revelation principle of the mechanism de-
sign theory [16], outcomes from any equilibrium are equiva-
lent to a truthful equilibrium of a direct mechanism, where
the players report their private values truthfully. Without
loss of generality, we only design a direct auction mechanism.
Let V be the vendor of a barter item and C = {Ci |
i = 1, 2, · · · , N} be the set of N competitors. Competitors
individually assess the private quality values of V ’s barter,
which are independently distributed. Assume competitor
Ci’s private quality value Xi is distributed over the interval
χi = [0, $] according to the distribution Fi with associated
density function fi. We allow for asymmetries among the
competitors: the distributions of the estimated quality val-
ues might be different among competitors. Let χ =
N∏
j=1
χj
denote the product of the sets of estimated quality values
and for ∀i, χ¬i =
∏
j 6=i
χj . Define f(x) to be the joint density
of X = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ). Since estimated quality values are
independently distributed, f(X) =
N∏
j=1
fj(xj) and similarly
we define f¬i(X¬i) =
∏
j 6=i
fj(xj) to be the joint density of
X¬i = (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ).
Consider a direct mechanism (Q,M) for knowledge barter-
auctioning, which consists of a pair of functions: Q:χ → ∆
and M :χ → RN , where Qi(x) is the probability in which
competitor Ci will win the competition and Mi(x) is the
expected payment made by Ci. With the distributions of
knowledge quality values from the competitors, given a di-
rect mechanism, denote
qi(zi) =
∫
χ¬i
Qi(zi, x¬i)f¬i(x¬i)dx¬i (1)
the probability in which Ci will win the competition when
their reported value is zi and all other competitors report
their private values truthfully. Similarly, denote
mi(zi) =
∫
χ¬i
Mi(zi, x¬i)f¬i(x¬i)dx¬i (2)
the expected payment from Ci when their reported value is
zi and all other competitors tell the truth.
Then Ui(xi), the expected payoff (or utility) for competi-
tor Ci, is the revenue minus the corresponding cost. When
Ci’s true value is xi, but the reported value is zi, again as-
suming that all other competitors tell the truth, Ci’s utility
is expressed as
Ui(zi) = qi(zi)xi −mi(zi). (3)
Apart from the goal of maximising the vendor’s revenue,
Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rationality (IR)
are two other desired properties.
Definition 1. Incentive Compatibility (IC)
The direct mechanism (Q,M) is said to be incentive com-
patible, if for ∀i, Ui(xi) ≡ qi(xi)xi − mi(xi) ≥ qi(zi)xi −
mi(zi), where Ci’s true and reported values are xi and zi
respectively.
We refer to Ui(xi) as the equilibrium payoff function, which
can also be expressed as
Ui(xi) = max
zi∈χi
{qi(zi)xi −mi(zi)}. (4)
The IC property is to ensure that rational competitors
will prefer telling the truth about their private quality val-
ues because it would help increase their expected payoff as
compared to not doing so. A competitor’s expected payoff in
an incentive compatible direct mechanism (Q,M) depends
only on the allocation rule, up to an additive constant.
Definition 2. Individual Rationality (IR)
Assume that by no participation a competitor’s payoff is
zero. A direct mechanism (Q,M) is said to be individual
rational, if for ∀i, Ui(xi) ≥ 0, where competitor Ci’s true
value is xi.
If the payment required by an auction mechanism is too
high, potential competitors may choose not to participate.
The IR property is to ensure rational competitors that they
would never be worse off by participating in the auction.
4.2 Optimal Auction for Quality-aware Knowl-
edge Bartering
From the game-theoretic point of view, knowledge barter-
ing can be considered a game among the competitors whose
bidding strategies are functions of their private value distri-
butions. The game will reach the equilibrium if the players
all want to maximise their expected payoff.
In an auction, the vendor’s revenue, denoted by R, comes
from the payment of all competitors. It is generally the sum
of all competitors’ payment. Because a UGC contribution is
indivisible in knowledge bartering, only one competitor will
win it. In a direct mechanism, the expected revenue of the
vendor is defined as
E[R] =
∑
i∈N
E[mi(Xi)].
An optimal auction mechanism is defined as follows for
each vendor to maximise their expected revenue by bartering
their UGC contribution with the auction winner.
Definition 3. Optimal Auction Mechanism
A direct mechanism is an optimal auction if the outcome
resulted from the mechanism’s allocation and payment rules
maximises the expected revenue of the vendor under the con-
straints of incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Specifically, an optimal auction mechanism needs to de-
fine the allocation and payment rules in order to solve the
following problem:
max(E[R]), subject to
(1) Ui(xi) = max
zi∈χi
{qi(zi)xi −mi(zi)} and
(2) Ui(0) ≥ 0.
In a direct mechanism (Q,M), the ex ante expected pay-
ment of competitor Ci is
(5)
E[mi(Xi)] =
∫ ωi
0
mi(xi)fi(xi)dxi
= mi(0) +
∫ ωi
0
xiqi(xi)fi(xi)dxi
−
∫ ωi
0
(1− Fi(xi))qi(xi)dxi.
This optimisation problem can be further clarified by defin-
ing virtual valuation of private value.
Definition 4. Virtual valuation
The virtual valuation of competitor Ci is ψi(.) ≡ xi −
1− Fi(.)
fi(.)
.
The auction problem is said to be regular if for ∀i, ψi(.) is
an increasing function of the true value xi. In the remain-
der of the paper, we assume the auction problem is regular.
Then Equation 5 can be reformulated as
E[mi(Xi)] = mi(0) +
∫
χ
ψi(xi)Qi(x)f(x)dx
by using the definition of qi(xi) from Equation 1 and ψi(.)
from Definition 4.
So the vendor’s objective is to design a direct mechanism
so as to maximise∑
i∈N
mi(0) +
∫
χ
(
∑
i∈N
ψi(xi)Qi(x))f(x)dx. (6)
while satisfying the constraints of incentive compatibility
and individual rationality. As mi(0) is a constant, max-
imising
∑
i∈N
ψi(xi)Qi(x) will maximise Equation 6.
Vickrey - Clarke - Groves (VCG) [11] is an efficient auction
mechanism that can maximise social surplus of the bidders’
set, that is
∑
i∈N
xiQi(x). Considering
∑
i∈N
ψi(xi)Qi(x) to be
the virtual social surplus, that is the social surplus comprised
of virtual private quality values, we design the Knowledge
Optimal Barter-Auction (KOBA) algorithm based on VCG
in order to achieve maximisation of virtual social surplus,
which is illustrated by Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: Knowledge Optimal Barter-Auction
(KOBA)
a. Estimate each Ci’s virtual private quality value
distribution ψi(xi) towards the vendor’s barter.
b. Run the VCG mechanism over a set of virtual quality
private value distributions (PQVDS) from all
competitors PQV DS = {ψi(xi) | i = 1, 2, · · · , N}:
(Q′,M ′)← V CG(PQV DS).
c. Derive the allocation and payment rules:
Qi(xi) = Q
′
i(xi) and Mi(xi) = max(M
′
i(xi), ψ
−1
i (0))
Because there is only one indivisible barter item for auc-
tion in every knowledge trading process using KOBA, the
mechanism can actually be reduced to a second price auc-
tion. Let yi(x¬i) = inf{zi:ψi(zi) ≥ 0 ∧ ∀j 6= i, ψi(zi) ≥
ψj(xj)}, which is the minimum private quality value corre-
sponding to the non-negative virtual value that can win the
auction. The allocation and payment rules in Algorithm 1
can be reformulated as
Qi(zi, x¬i) =
 1 if zi ≥ yi(x¬i)0 if zi < yi(x¬i),
Mi(x) =
 yi(x¬i) if Qi(x) = 10 if Qi(x) = 0.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The goal of conducting experiments is to test the feasi-
bility and also measure the performance of the knowledge
barter-auctioning solution using a real-world dataset. Be-
cause there is no system that adopts knowledge barter auc-
tioning, we collected real data from a question-answering
system Yahoo!Answers to simulate a knowledge market un-
derpinned by the barter-auctioning mechanism. We are con-
scious that the system actually adopts a remunerative in-
centive mechanism based on virtual currency. We only used
their answers and the associated questions as UGC contribu-
tions to simulate knowledge barter-auctioning, that is, par-
ticipants barter auction knowledge items that each comprises
an answer and the corresponding question.
5.1 Data Collection and Experimental Design
To best simulate the environment where participants in-
teract in a knowledge market, our experimental dataset was
collected from Yahoo!Answers New Zealand using open APIs
to retrieve the questions and answers in different categories.
We collected 92, 112 questions each with at least one answer
in the period from April 2008 to March 2011.
There are 26 top-level categories and each category was
treated as an interest in our experiments. Two participants
have overlapping sets of interests if they have knowledge
items falling into each other’s SOI. By applying this rule,
we obtained hundreds of potential trading groups, each con-
sisting of one vendor and tens of competitors, as illustrated
by Figure 2. The number of trading groups and the size of
each trading group can be scaled up/down by adjusting the
each participant’s SOI. Furthermore, we need to measure the
knowledge quality as it is the pivot of the allocation and pay-
ment rules in the knowledge barter-auctioning solution. As
a proof of concept, we measured the quality of a knowledge
item based on the relevance of the answer to the question
using Kullback-Leibler divergence [12] in our experiments.
Experiments were designed to compare the vendor’s ex-
pected revenue between the quality-aware knowledge barter-
auctioning mechanism and a quality-unaware knowledge bar-
tering mechanism. Additional experiments were also de-
signed to compare the performance of the two mechanisms,
including how the quality of bids affects the competitors’
winning probability and how the number of competitors af-
fects the vendor’s expected revenue.
5.2 Estimation of Private Quality Value Dis-
tributions
In a quality-unaware knowledge bartering process [14],
quality is only factored in the derivation of the edge weight
representing a supply-demand relationship but not in the
selection of barter partners. A low quality supply would
still be bartered if it were an indispensable constituent of
the maximum-weight online silk road that achieves social
welfare maximisation. Therefore, the probability of a UGC
contribution being successfully bartered is essentially inde-
pendent of its quality. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity
yet without losing generality, random selection of a barter
partner is used in a quality-unaware knowledge bartering
process in our experiments and such mechanism is referred
to as Quality-Unaware Random Bartering (QURB).
Conversely, in a quality-aware knowledge barter-auctioning
process consisting of vendor V who wants to barter auc-
tion their knowledge BV and N competitors {Ci | i =
1, 2, · · · , N} who can offer an exchange in V ’s set of inter-
ests. Let qVi denote competitor Ci’s private quality value
estimate towards BV and BSi = {Bji | i = 1, 2, · · · , N ∧ j =
1, 2, · · · ,M ∧ SOI(Bji ) ∩ SOI(V ) 6= ∅} denote the set of
Ci’s barter items that are within V ’s set of interests. If
Qi = {qji | j = 1, 2, · · · ,M} denotes the set of quality
values of Ci’s M barter options, then Ci’s quality of bid
is set to the quality closest to but no more than the pri-
vate quality value estimate, that is, qbi = min(q
V
i , q
k
i ), where
k =
M
arg min
j=1
(| qji − qVi |). So the bidding quality set is com-
prised of the private quality values of all competitors’ bids,
that is, Qb = {qbi | i = 1, 2, · · · , N}.
In a Bayesian optimal auction, probability distributions
of private values are assumed common knowledge for both
the vendor and the competitors and the probability den-
sity functions should be monotonically increasing to satisfy
the regularity requirement. Many functions, such as uniform
distributions, exponential distributions and normal distribu-
tions, satisfy this requirement. For the sake of simplicity yet
without losing generality, we use an exponential distribution
f(x) = xθ as the probability density function for all competi-
tors in our experiments. It is clear that f(x) is regular when
θ > 1 and partially regular when 0 < θ < 1. As such we
generate different sets of private quality value distributions
by random selection of θ.
5.2.1 Vendor’s expected revenue in relation to the pri-
vate quality value distributions of the bids
This experiment tests how the private quality value dis-
tributions of the bids affect the vendor’s expected revenue
using QURB and KOBA respectively.
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Figure 3: Vendor’s expected revenue in relation to
the quality of bids (using PQVDS-1)
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Figure 4: Vendor’s expected revenue in relation to
the quality of bids (using PQVDS-2)
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Figure 5: Vendor’s expected revenue in relation to
the quality of bids (using PQVDS-3)
We randomly selected 30 trading groups from the collected
dataset, each consisting of a vendor and up to 15 competi-
tors who were randomly chosen from all qualified bidders
and assigned different private quality value distributions for
their bids. For each trading group, we recorded the vendor’s
expected revenue, which is the quality value of the winning
barter, using 3 different sets of private quality value distri-
butions, referred to as PQVDS-1, PQVDS-2, and PQVDS-3
respectively, as shown in Figure 3, 4, and 5 respectively.
It is clear that the vendor’s expected revenue fluctuates
with the quality of bids using both QURB and KOBA, how-
ever KOBA is less sensitive to the changes of quality of bids.
More importantly, the average revenue using KOBA is sig-
nificantly higher than that using QURB. This result is inde-
pendent of the private quality value distribution sets.
5.2.2 Vendor’s expected revenue in relation to the num-
ber of competitors
This experiment tests how the number of competitors in
a trading group affects the vendor’s expected revenue using
QURB and KOBA respectively. We randomly selected 30
trading groups from the collected dataset, each consisting
of a vendor and a varying number of competitors who were
randomly chosen from all qualified bidders and assigned dif-
ferent private quality value distributions for their bids. The
number of competitors in each group was set to 5, 10, 15,
20, 25, and 30 in 6 tests. We recorded the vendor’s expected
revenue in each trading group for each of the 6 tests and
then computed the average expected revenue.
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Figure 6: Expected revenue in relation to the num-
ber of competitors
It is clear from Figure 6 that with the increase of the
number of competitors, the expected revenue obtained by
KOBA is approaching the optimum of 1.0, which confirms
the theoretical result of auction theory. In contrast, the
expected revenue obtained by QURB is independent of the
number of competitors. Figure 6 again confirms the result
in the first experiment that the average expected revenue
obtained by KOBA is much higher than that by QURB.
5.2.3 Competitors’ winning probability in relation to
bids’ private quality value distributions
This experiment tests how the private quality value dis-
tributions of the bids affect competitors’s winning proba-
bility using QURB and KOBA respectively. We randomly
selected 100 trading groups from the collected dataset, each
consisting of a vendor and up to 15 competitors who were
randomly chosen from all qualified bidders and assigned dif-
ferent private quality value distributions for their bids. For
each trading group, we recorded the quality of bids from all
competitors and computed the percentage of winning in dif-
ferent quality intervals accordingly using 3 different sets of
private quality value distributions of PQVDS-1, PQVDS-2,
and PQVDS-3, as shown in Figure 7, 8, and 9 respectively.
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Figure 7: Winning probability in relation to the
quality of bids (using PQVDS-1)
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Figure 8: Winning probability in relation to the
quality of bids (using PQVDS-2)
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Figure 9: Winning probability in relation to the
quality of bids (using PQVDS-3)
It is clear that the quality of bids has no direct impact on
the competitors’ winning probability using QURB, which
is constantly low. In contrast, the quality of bids plays a
pivotal role in winning the auction using KOBA, where bids
of higher quality obviously have a higher winning probability
and a mild improvement of quality can dramatically increase
the winning probability. This result is independent of the
private quality value distribution sets.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented knowledge barter-auctioning as
an alternative non-financial incentive mechanism, in which
bartering is used to motivate quantity and auctioning is used
to stimulate quality. It provides an optimal way for the
vendor to choose the best barter partner in order to max-
imise their expected revenue. A UGC contribution of higher
quality will enable the vendor to attract more competitors
and consequently make a higher revenue through auction-
ing. Competitors are equally motivated to offer their own
high-quality UGC contributions to barter with the vendor
because the higher quality of the bid a competitor offers,
the more likely they will win the auction. Experimental re-
sults have confirmed the ramifications of UGC quality in
knowledge bartering processes.
While this work has shown promising results, we are con-
scious that it is non-trivial to choose an appropriate private
quality value distribution in practice. Therefore, an immi-
nent task is to devise an optimal auction algorithm that
does not require prior knowledge of private quality value
distributions. We will work on a quality evaluation strategy
that takes into account more factors than only the relevance.
We will need to design and conduct experiments to compare
knowledge barter-auctioning with other non-financial incen-
tive mechanisms such as the virtual currency.
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